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Abstract
Islamophobia, like xenophobia, points to deep-seated,
ingrained discrimination against a particular group, whose
effective enjoyment of fundamental rights is impaired. This
in turn triggers the human rights obligations of liberal dem-
ocratic states, more particularly states’ positive obligations
(informed by reasonability considerations) to ensure that
fundamental rights are effectively enjoyed, and thus also
respected in interpersonal relationships. This article identifies
and compares the fault lines in the practice of three inter-
national human rights supervisory mechanisms in relation to
Islamophobia, namely the Human Rights Committee (Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights (European Convention on
Human Rights) and the Advisory Committee of the Frame-
work Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
The supervisory practice is analysed in two steps: The analy-
sis of each international supervisory mechanism’s jurispru-
dence, in itself, is followed by the comparison of the fault
lines. The latter comparison is structured around the two
main strands of strategies that states could adopt in order to
counter intolerance: On the one hand, the active promotion
of tolerance, inter alia through education, awareness-raising
campaigns and the stimulation of intercultural dialogue; on
the other, countering acts informed by intolerance, in terms
of the prohibition of discrimination (and/or the effective
enjoyment of substantive fundamental rights). Having
regard to the respective strengths and weaknesses of the
supervisory practice of these three international supervisory
mechanisms, the article concludes with some overarching
recommendations.
Keywords: Human rights, positive state obligations, islamo-
phobia, international supervisory mechanisms
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1 Introduction: Islamophobia,
Human Rights Implications
and Related Positive State
Obligations
The increasing incidence of Islamophobia in the West-
ern world, not in the least since the terrorist attacks of
9/11, and the violent attempts to establish an Islamic
State (ISIS),1 has been difficult to ignore. Notwith-
standing the abundant literature on Islamophobia, no
generally agreed upon definition can be identified.2
Nevertheless, in its core, Islamophobia refers to preju-
dice against Muslims and, by way of translation of this
state of mind, actual intolerant attitudes towards Mus-
lims, ultimately resulting in policies and practices that
target and discriminate against Muslims.3 Importantly,
Islamophobia does not merely concern discrimination
on grounds of belief, but often concerns intersectional
discrimination, that is discrimination on a combination
of grounds.4 Muslims are indeed not only defined in
terms of their religious affiliation but also in terms of
their assumed ethnicity, the exact dividing line between
1. See, inter alia www.theguardian.com/world/isis. Several reports by
prominent non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as various
bodies of the Council of Europe, and the European Union (EU)’s Funda-
mental Rights Agency document on the worrying trend of multiple
manifestations of intolerance against Muslims: see, inter alia, Ernes
Bayrakli and Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2017 (SETA
2018), Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Islam,
Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe (Resolution 1743) Council of
Europe 2010; inter alia EU High Level Group on Combating Racism,
Xenophobia and Other Forms of Intolerance, available at: https://
ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=51025 (last vis-
ited 30 September 2019). See also EU Midis II Main Results (Second EU
Minorities and Discrimination Survey), available at: https://
fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2017-eu-midis-ii-
main-results_en.pdf (last visited 30 September 2019), at 64-5.
2. A definition which is well regarded is the one by the British race rela-
tions NGO the Runnymede Trust, that coined the term in 1997 in the
report ‘Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All’.
3. E. Bayrakli and F. Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2017 (SETA
2018), at 25.
4. T. Makkonen, Multiple, Compound and Intersectional Discrimination:
Bringing the Experiences of the Most Marginalised to the Fore, Turku,
Abo Akademi (2002), at 9.
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religious and ethnic elements of group identity often
difficult to separate. In this respect, Islamophobia has
been described as a particular kind of racism targeting
Muslims, acknowledging that religion plays a weighty
role in xenophobia.5 Furthermore, when Islamophobic
measures are directed towards the wearing of religious
clothing, this tends to affect predominantly women,
thus potentially combining three grounds of discrimi-
nation: religion, race and gender.6
Furthermore, it is important to realise that an instance
of discrimination does not only affect the right not to be
discriminated against, as a distinct fundamental right,
but often also disproportionately limits the enjoyment of
other fundamental rights. Having a closer look at the
broad range of manifestation of Islamophobia helps clar-
ify the potentially far-reaching human rights implica-
tions of Islamophobia.7 Discriminatory violence against
Muslims may fall in the scope of application of the
prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treat-
ment (or the right to respect for privacy, as encompass-
ing respect for the physical integrity). Discrimination
infused by Islamophobia can also block one’s equal and
effective access to education, employment or public ser-
vices, because of one’s (assumed) Muslim identity. Such
instances of direct discrimination jeopardise Muslims’
equal participation in society.8 A disproportionate limi-
tation on the freedom to manifest Islam in public, and,
more particularly, when the manifestation concerns the
wearing of religious garments,9 or the eating of halal
food or respecting prayer times, can also be infused by
Islamophobia.10 The related violation of the freedom of
religion and the more latent, more hidden, more indi-
rect discrimination also limits one’s equal and effective
access to education, to employment and even to public
space at large, thus similarly translating into the viola-
tion of multiple overlapping fundamental rights and
undermining Muslims’ participation in society.11 ECRI
General Policy Recommendation no 5 on combating
intolerance and discrimination against Muslims con-
firms this broad understanding of Islamophobia as inter-
related with multiple human rights violations, constitut-
5. Ibid.
6. See HRC, Sonia Yaker v. France, CCPR/C/123/D/2747/2016, 17 July
2018, at para. 8.17.
7. See also preamble of ECRI General Policy Recommendation no 5 on
combating intolerance and discrimination against Muslims. See also I.
Trispiotis, ‘Islamophobia as a Key Contextual Factor in Human Rights
Adjudication’, in I. Law et al. (eds.), Countering Islamophobia in Europe
(2019), at 9.
8. See in this regard the reports, above n. 1.
9. The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly has noted with con-
cern the negative stereotypes about Muslim women in the debate
about the Islamic headscarf and veil: see, inter alia, PACE Resolution
1887.
10. The UN Human Rights Council does not only explicitly recommend
states to foster a domestic environment of religious tolerance, peace
and respect (Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18, Combating intol-
erance, negative stereotyping and stigmatisation of, and discrimination,
incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on religion
or belief, A/HRC/RES’16/18, 12 April 2011, at para. 5) but also high-
lights in this respect the importance of the effective protection of reli-
gious minorities’ freedom to manifest their religion (ibid., at para. 6b).
11. See infra on S.A.S. v. France.
ing ‘a multifaceted problem of restricted religious free-
dom, religious and intersectional discrimination and
social exclusion’.12
The often far-reaching human rights implications of
Islamophobia invite liberal democracies to counter
Islamophobia, given their commitment to respecting
fundamental rights throughout their policies and activi-
ties. In addition to states’ negative state obligations not
to engage in Islamophobic policies and acts, states also
have a variety of positive state obligations, aimed at
ensuring that fundamental rights are effectively enjoyed,
also in horizontal, interpersonal relations.13 This article
sets out to analyse and compare the positive state obliga-
tions to counter Islamophobia that are identified by
selected international supervisory mechanisms of rele-
vant human rights conventions.
The following paragraphs of this introduction not only
expand on the notion of positive state obligations and
their relation to the effectiveness principle but will also
reflect on the notion of ‘countering Islamophobia’ as
encompassing both countering a state of mind and
countering acts/policies informed by that state of mind.
This in turn triggers the question whether human rights
requires states to change the hearts and minds of their
subjects. The introduction then proceeds with the iden-
tification of the human rights the analysis zooms in on,
as well as with the selection of the human rights conven-
tions and related international supervisory mechanisms.
The second part of the article proceeds with highlight-
ing the parallels and differences between these three
supervisory mechanisms and their supervisory practices,
which will colour the extent to which the latter are
comparable and can be fully compared. Furthermore, a
more detailed overview is given of the subsequent two-
step analysis of the supervisory practice of the selected
international supervisory mechanisms: first, an analysis
mechanism by mechanism; second, a comparison of the
respective fault lines in these supervisory practices,
including the respective strengths and weaknesses.
It is important to realise that, particularly for civil and
political rights, positive state obligations have been
identified through reliance on the effectiveness princi-
ple, namely the understanding that fundamental rights
need to be real and effective, not theoretical or illuso-
ry.14 Over time, the overarching concern with the effec-
tive protection of fundamental rights has steered the
interpretation of human rights and the related state obli-
gations towards an ever more elaborate list of positive
12. Trispiotis, above n. 7, at 16.
13. See, inter alia HRC, General Comment no 31, at paras. 7-8.
14. The ECtHR has developed a steady line of jurisprudence to this effect,
see, e.g. Airey v. Ireland, ECHR Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidi-
arity and Primarity in the ECHR, Brill (2009), at 238. (1979) Series A,
No. 6389/73, at para. 24; Artico v. Italy, ECHR (1980) Series A, No.
6694, 74, at para. 33; Mehmet Eren v. Turkey, ECHR (2008) Series A,
No. 32347, at 2. The Human Rights Committee also refers numerous
times to the effective protection principle in its supervisory practice,
inter alia in General Comment no 31 on the Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant.
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state obligations.15 The effectiveness principle is thus a
key consideration throughout this article, which is also
returned to when discussing the level of scrutiny that is
adopted by international supervisory mechanisms.
When focusing on positives state obligations, it is
important to highlight that the dividing line between
negative and positive state obligations is not always that
clear-cut, also because of the interaction between the
public and the private sphere. Negative state obligations
constrain public policies and actions. Still, public poli-
cies, even when formulated in neutral terms, can never-
theless be stigmatising (due to the overall context in
which the policy is adopted) towards particular groups,
further increasing societal intolerance against these
groups.16 Put differently, the negative obligation not to
adopt such stigmatising legislation goes hand in hand
with positive state obligations to actively counter intol-
erance between groups.17
Since Islamophobia is described above as a particular
state of mind (prejudice against Muslims) as well as the
acts of discrimination informed by this state of mind,
countering Islamophobia similarly has two strands,
namely countering both the state of mind and the acts
informed thereby. The sociological article in this special
issue by Böcker has revealed that the answer to the
question whether law can change the hearts and minds
does not have a clear-cut answer. Law is primarily
targeted at people’s actions, which in turn may influ-
ence, over time, the way they actually feel about per-
sons/things. Nevertheless, as was further developed in
Berry’s paper in this special issue, public authorities’
have the power to regulate mechanisms that can have
meaningful impact on the way people see others,
including (public) education, through its socialisation
function, and the media.18 Relatedly, public authorities
can organise awareness-raising campaigns, and related
campaigns aimed at different population groups coming
together, and building shared experiences.
This article focuses on what a selection of international
supervisory mechanisms has identified in terms of posi-
15. Inter alia, J.-F. Akandji-Kombe, Positive Obligations Under the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of
the European Convention on Human Rights (Human rights handbooks,
No. 7) Strasbourg, Council of Europe (2007).
16. International courts should reflect this interrelation between public poli-
cies and private intolerance in their review of the public policies con-
cerned. See infra the critical analysis in relation to ECtHR case law in
S.A.S v. France.
17. PACE Res. 1743 contains a very negative assessment of total bans on
full-face veils in public, exactly because of the underlying exclusionary
message.
18. For a further discussion of the importance of the right to education, see
infra. Freedom of expression also benefits the media, but it is important
to keep in mind that the exercise of the freedom of expression carries
with it duties and responsibilities (see, inter alia Art. 10(2) ECtHR). In
terms of minority-specific rights, these duties and responsibilities are
further expanded upon, e.g. 9(4)FCNM which obliges state parties to
adopted ‘adequate measures in order to facilitate access to the media
for persons belonging to national minorities and in order to promote
tolerance and permit cultural pluralism’. Whilst not intending to dis-
count the importance of media and their coverage of minorities, the
analysis of this article does not expand upon the media.
tive state obligations regarding fundamental rights,
either explicitly in relation to manifestations of Islamo-
phobia or having the potential to be used to counter
Islamophobia. It will have regard to two strands of obli-
gations, both obligations that concern countering acts of
discrimination, and obligations that rather concern the
proactive promotion of reducing prejudice itself, and
thus more directly aimed at changing the hearts and
minds.
As Islamophobia targets Muslims as members of an eth-
nic and or religious minority, it is surely relevant to
consider the foundational principles of minority protec-
tion. These core concerns of minority-specific rights
speak to the particular vulnerabilities minorities experi-
ence in terms of equality (effective protection against
discrimination and right to substantive equal treatment),
identity (right to respect for the separate minority iden-
tity) and participation.19 The broad range of manifesta-
tions of Islamophobia has revealed fundamental prob-
lems in relation to these three principles.
Given Islamophobia’s intrinsic link to prejudice and
discrimination against Muslims, particular attention will
be had to the way in which the international supervisory
mechanisms assess alleged instances of discrimination,
be that direct or indirect discrimination. The prohi-
bition of discrimination is crucially about preventing
disadvantageous treatment based on prejudice, since the
latter does not constitute a reasonable and objective jus-
tification.20
Furthermore, several fundamental rights are of special
relevance to (religious) minorities in themselves, and in
combination with the prohibition of discrimination, so
as to ensure the equal and effective enjoyment of these
fundamental rights. The freedom of religion is obvious-
ly an important right that nurtures the right to a sepa-
rate religious identity for persons belonging to religious
minorities. Education has a key role to play in relation to
the shaping of the society of tomorrow: It does not only
have an important qualification function but also a vital
socialisation function. Education’s socialisation function
is important for government in the sense that it is a cru-
cial vehicle to pass national values and ways of life to the
next generation, enabling them to function optimally in
society. At the same time, education is also crucially
important for minorities in the sense that they want pro-
tection against indoctrination, so that their right to a
separate identity is not disregarded. Civil and political
human rights law obliges public authorities to respect a
parent’s religious convictions throughout public educa-
tion, which has repercussions for the content of the cur-
19. See, inter alia K. Henrard, ‘Challenges to Participation in the Name of
“Integration”: Participation, Equality and Identity as Interrelated Foun-
dational Principles of Minority Protection’, in W. Romans, I. Ulasiuk and
A. Thomson (eds.), Effective Participation of National Minorities and
Conflict Prevention, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff (2019), at 43-80. See
also A. Verstichel, Participation, Representation and Identity: The
Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities to Effective Participation in
Public Affairs: Content, Justification and Limits, Antwerp, Intersentia
(2009).
20. See, inter alia www.coe.int/en/web/compass/discrimination-and-
intolerance.
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riculum and possible exemption schemes.21 Social
human rights add that ‘education shall … strengthen
the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
… promote understanding, tolerance and friendship
among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious
groups’.22 To some extent, this protection against
indoctrination, and the duty to have a pro-tolerance cur-
riculum, strengthens the right to equal and effective
access to education of minority children.23 Education’s
qualification function concerns the passing on of knowl-
edge and qualifications, enabling one’s participation in
society. Equal and effective access to education is thus
key to one’s equal participation in society. Similarly,
equal access to employment, and to public space at
large, is essential for one’s equal participation in society.
This article focuses on three conventions and what the
supervisory practice of their respective international
supervisory mechanisms has clarified about the positive
state obligations to counter Islamophobia and provide
effective protection against discrimination and of the
freedom to manifest one’s religion, also in relation to
access to public education, to employment and to public
space at large.24 In light of that thematic focus in rela-
tion to a particular minority group, the following analy-
sis focuses on the supervisory practice of three inter-
national human rights supervisory mechanisms, namely
the Human Rights Committee (HRC; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)), the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the
Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities (AC/FCNM).
2 International Supervisory
Practice Concerning Positive
State Obligations in Relation
to Islamophobia: HRC/
ICCPR, ECtHR, AC/FCNM
Prior to zooming in on the analysis of the (fault lines of
the) supervisory practice of these three selected
mechanisms, it is important to highlight the respective
differences and similarities between these mechanisms.
There are various types of supervisory practice: com-
plaints procedures, the review of periodic state report-
ing, and overarching (not state-specific) thematic docu-
ments. The ECtHR only has complaints procedures; the
AC/FCNM reviews periodic state reporting, and devel-
21. Art. 18(4) ICCPR and Art. 2, protocol 1 ECHR.
22. Art. 13(1) ICESCR.
23. See, inter alia A Human Rights based Approach to Education for All,
UNICEF 2007, 13.
24. See also Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18 on Combating Intol-
erance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatisation of, and Discrimi-
nation, Incitement of Violence and Violence against Persons based on
Religion or Belief, A/HRC/RES/16/18, 12 April 2011, at paras. 1 and 6.
ops thematic commentaries; and the HRC combines all
three modalities of supervisory practice.
When international supervisory mechanisms’ supervi-
sion happens through complaints procedures, this also
means that the extent to which they can develop (quasi)
jurisprudence, and provide clarification about the extent
of state parties (positive) obligations, depends on the
cases brought to them. Periodic state reporting, on the
other hand, provides the opportunity to the supervisory
mechanism to review the total picture of the extent to
which and the way in which a state implements its obli-
gations under the convention. To the extent that this
review also takes into account NGO’s shadow reports
and conducts visits in the country under review, it
allows the supervisory mechanism to conduct a rather
searching and encompassing review. Furthermore, due
to the recurring process of the review, this type of
supervisory practice also allows the development of lines
of supervisory practice that can be refined over subse-
quent review cycles, particularly when follow-up proce-
dures are devised.
Only the ECtHR is an international court in the narrow
sense, having the power to pronounce legally binding
judgments.25 The HRC can also hear individual com-
plaints against particular states,26 but its ‘views’ are not
legally binding. Nevertheless, the de facto difference
between legally binding judgments and not legally
binding views of Treaty Bodies officially mandated to
review compliance of state parties with their treaty obli-
gations is becoming less visible. On the one hand, the
pressure to comply with non-legally binding views is
heightened through the public availability of these views
and exposure by civil society (and media). On the other,
in the end, states cannot be forced to comply with legal-
ly binding judgments; so also, here the political will to
comply needs to be present (or created).27 The vast dif-
ference in quantity of case law of the ECtHR as
compared to the HRC confirms the dependence of this
type of supervisory practice on complaints being filed
by applicants. The HRC can expand its supervisory
practice through the review of periodic state reporting,
and the adoption of general comments, that crystallise
its supervisory practice in relation to a particular mat-
ter.28
The supervisory practice of the FCNM does not
encompass complaints procedures, which limit the
extent to which this practice directly can contribute to
the effective protection of rights of particular com-
plainants. Nevertheless, the review of periodic state
25. Art. 32 ECHR. See also Arts. 33 and 34 regarding individual and inter-
state complaints.
26. See ICCPR, First Optional Protocol.
27. See, inter alia N. Grossman, H.G. Cohen, A. Follesdal and G. Ulfstein
(eds.), Legitimacy and International Courts, Cambridge, CUP (2018).
28. These general comments are not updated on an ongoing basis, and the
general comments on the prohibition of discrimination (no 18) and on
the freedom of religion (no 22) date back from 1989 and 1993,
respectively. General comment no 31 on the Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant dates back
from 2004 and has been referred to above in relation to the effective
protection principle.
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reporting does allow the Advisory Committee to devel-
op – through its not legally binding opinions – lines of
supervisory practice, as well as follow-up review. To the
extent that these opinions are compiled on an article-by-
article basis per review cycle,29 it optimises the accessi-
bility of these lines of supervisory practice, and the way
these develop over the distinctive review cycles. Simi-
larly, the development of so-called thematic commenta-
ries crystallises this supervisory practice about a particu-
lar theme, such as education, and participation.30
The following parts analyse the selected supervisory
practice in two steps; first, the selected practice of each
supervisory mechanism is analysed (parts 3-5), after
which a comparison is made of the fault lines of the
respective supervisory practice (part 6). In the first step,
the analysis of the supervisory practice starts with an
assessment of the relevant baseline, after which the most
relevant available supervisory practice, for this article, is
reviewed. For the HRC (part 3), first the most relevant
individual complaints are assessed, followed by the
identification of lines of practice that become visible
through the concluding observations (periodic state
reporting). Subsequently, the relevant case law of the
ECtHR is discussed (part 4), against the background of
the general development lines of the Court’s jurispru-
dence concerning the prohibition of discrimination and
the freedom to manifest one’s religion. While both the
HRC and ECtHR have cases that concern the more
latent forms of Islamophobia with impact on effective
access to education (including requirements as to the
content of the curriculum and exemption schemes), the
public space at large and/or employment, the ECtHR,
in addition, has a line of jurisprudence pertaining to dis-
criminatory violence against religious minorities. The
fifth part shifts the focus of analysis to the AC/FCNM.
As the central features and related content of the
FCNM is less well-known, the analysis of the supervi-
sory practice of the AC/FCNM is preceded by a discus-
sion of the most relevant provisions of the FCNM in
relation to positive state obligations concerning Islamo-
phobia.
When turning to the comparison of the fault lines in
these supervisory practices, it is important to emphasise
that these fault lines are not fully comparable because of
the respective differences in the nature of supervisory
practice. Nevertheless, a comparison at a higher level of
abstraction remains possible, more particularly return-
ing to the two strands of countering Islamophobia iden-
tified above: fighting instances of discrimination versus
actively promoting understanding and respect of groups
with a different identity, a Muslim identity in particu-
lar. Having regard to the respective strengths and weak-
nesses of the supervisory practice of these three inter-
national supervisory mechanisms, the article concludes
with some overarching recommendations.
29. www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/compilation-of-opinions.
30. www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/thematic-commentaries.
3 The Human Rights
Committee of the ICCPR
and Islamophobia
In line with the limited jurisprudence of the HRC, very
few cases can be identified as directly or indirectly rele-
vant to gauge the extent to which the Committee identi-
fies positive state obligations to counter Islamophobia.
Nevertheless, as the baseline attitude of the HRC to its
supervisory role has positive repercussions for the
extent to which it offers protection of Muslim minori-
ties against Islamophobia, and measures infused by
Islamophobia, an evaluation of this baseline in the
HRC’s case law is called for (3.1.1). Subsequently, cases
concerning more latent forms of Islamophobia, namely
neutral measures that amount to considerable limita-
tions on the freedom to manifest the Muslim religion,
are discussed (3.1.2). Thirdly, the attention shifts to the
case law on state duties to respect the religious and phil-
osophical convictions of the parents throughout public
education (3.1.3). In addition, the review of the HRC’s
Concluding Observations (3.2) provides insights into
what the HRC considers more generally important to
contribute to the effective protection of the prohibition
of discrimination and the freedom to manifest one’s
religion, also of relevance in relation to acts of Islamo-
phobia.
3.1 Individual Complaints
3.1.1 Admittedly, the HRC supervising the ICCPR does
not have a lot of cases on Article 18, ICCPR’s freedom
to manifest religion, nor cases brought in terms of Art-
icle 27, ICCPR’s right not to be denied the right to pro-
fess and practice their own religion in community with
the other members of their group.31Waldman v. Canada
is relevant to highlight in several respects. The claimant
invoked the violation of Article 27, Article 26 ICCPR
and Article 18 ICCPR because of the lack of public
funding Canada made available to Jewish private
schools, in contrast to the public funding of Catholic
private schools. The Committee decided this case on the
basis of Article 26 ICCPR, as a prohibited discrimi-
nation:32 A state does not have to provide public fund-
ing to private schools, but if it does so, it needs to pro-
ceed on a non-discriminatory basis; only providing
public funding to one minority religion is not reasonable
and objective.33 It would not be necessary to still evalu-
ate the alleged violation of Article 18, ICCPR’s freedom
of religion, and Article 27 ICCPR.34 The HRC thus
highlights the central importance of the right to equal
treatment in the human rights paradigm: It first tries to
31. S. Berry, ‘A Good Faith Interpretation of the Right to Manifest Religion?
The Diverging Approaches of the ECTHR and the UNHRC’, 37 Legal
Studies 672, at 681 (2017).
32. HRC, Areah Hollis Waldman v. Canada, Communication No.
694/1996, CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996.
33. Ibid., at para. 10.5.
34. Ibid., at para. 10.7.
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settle cases on this ground. As is confirmed in the dis-
cussion of the cases directly relevant for the Islamopho-
bia angle of this article, the HRC does not shy away
from evaluating complaints in terms of the prohibition
of discrimination.
Several of the HRC cases on the freedom of religion
concern interferences by the states, and thus negative
state obligations, not so much positive state obligations.
Nevertheless, these cases merit some attention as they
nicely reflect the rather high baseline scrutiny adopted
by the HRC, resulting in elevated protection levels.35
The HRC each time engages in an in concreto analysis of
the alleged threat, the appropriateness of the invoked
legitimate aim, the suitability and the proportionality of
the measure towards the legitimate aim. In relation to
the French prohibition to wear religious headwear for
identity cards, the HRC acknowledged the legitimate
aim that a picture needs to allow identification but
engaged in a critical proportionality review, underscor-
ing that wearing a turban does not hide the face and is
actually very representative as he wears this at all
times.36 Similarly, the HRC does not accept the prohi-
bition on wearing a keski, a small dagger to school, when
this is a religious manifestation for Sikhs, while the
keski does not pose a real threat to the rights and free-
doms of other pupils or to order at the school.37
3.1.2 The HRC has more recently been confronted with
cases that concern more latent forms of Islamophobia
which impact on the effective access of Muslims to
employment and the public space at large, more
particularly of Muslim women who want to wear a
headscarf or burqa. Admittedly, these cases concern the
operation of acts of legislation and thus rather interfer-
ences by public authorities with fundamental rights.
Nevertheless, the HRC’s jurisprudence sends a clear
message to states about the unacceptability of legislation
which disproportionately limits the manifestation of the
religion of particular religious minorities. On 17 July
2018 the HRC pronounced two views in similar cases
against France, brought by women who wear the full-
face veil for religious reasons and who complain about38
the French law criminalising the wearing of face-cover-
ing clothes in public. In Hebbadj v. France39 and Yaker
v. France,40 the HRC concludes to a violation not only
of the freedom of religion but also of the prohibition of
discrimination, adopting in both respects a suitably
strict scrutiny.
In relation to the former, the Committee accepts that in
certain situations it may be necessary to see the face of
persons in order to identify them, but public order
arguments cannot uphold a total ban on face-covering
35. Berry, above n. 31, at 683.
36. HRC, Ranjit Singh v. France, Communication No. 1852/2008, 4 Febru-
ary 2013, at para. 8.4.
37. HRC, Bikgramjit Singh v. France, Communication No. 1852/2008, 1
November 2012, at para. 8.7.
38. Ibid., at para. 8.10.
39. HRC, Hebbadj v. France, Communication No. 2807/2016, views of 17
July 2018, CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016.
40. HRC, Yaker v. France, Communication No. 2747/2016, views of 17 July
2018, CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016.
clothes in public.41 France also invoked ‘respect for the
rights of others’ because the ban would be necessary to
ensure living together. The HRC does not accept the
connection claimed by France between ‘the rights of
others’ and living together,42 while the legislative ban
would in any event not be proportionate,43 concluding
to a violation of Article 18.44 The HRC continues its
critical assessment when it proceeds with the discrimi-
nation complaint of the women. The legislative ban
obviously has a disproportionate impact on (Muslim)
women who want to wear a veil for religious reasons.
The HRC does not stop its45 assessment of the com-
plaint of indirect discrimination there, but also critically
notes that because of the many exceptions the law con-
tains, Muslim women who wear the burqa are left as the
main addressees of the law, as is also confirmed by the
enforcement of the law.46 Furthermore, the Committee
emphasises that France does not provide any justifica-
tion for the disproportionate manner in which the law is
applied, which is even more problematic because crim-
inal sanctions are imposed.47 In the end, the Committee
concludes to intersectional discrimination based on gen-
der and religion.
On 16 July 2018, the HRC also concludes to a violation
of the freedom of religion and the prohibition of (inter-
sectional) discrimination in F.A. v. France,48 on another
individual complaint by a Muslim woman against
France, this time complaining about a dismissal only
because she is wearing a headscarf in a child care centre.
Also, in this case, the HRC adopts a critical level of
scrutiny both in relation to the legitimate aims invoked
by the state, and of the alleged proportionality of the
limitation. The Committee does not accept the argu-
ment that the prohibition of a headscarf at a child care
centre would be necessary to secure the rights and free-
doms of parents or children, since the wearing of a
headscarf is not in itself proselytising.49 The Committee
correctly highlights that the ban on wearing a headscarf
at a child care centre has a stigmatising effect on the
religious community concerned.50 Turning to the com-
plaint that the internal regulation of the child care cen-
tre has a disproportionate impact on Muslim women, in
violation of the prohibition of discrimination, the Com-
mittee acknowledges the disproportionate impact on the
women of a particular religious community, and again
highlights its concern about the feelings of exclusion
and marginalisation this may cause for the group con-
cerned.51 The Committee critically opines that France
has not provided a sufficient reasonable and objective
justification for the disproportionate impact on Muslim
41. Ibid., at para. 8.7.
42. Ibid., at para. 8.10.
43. Ibid., at para. 8.11.
44. Ibid., at para. 8.12.
45. Ibid., at para. 8.17.
46. Ibid., at para. 8.13.
47. Ibid., at para. 8.16.
48. HRC, F.A. v. France, Communication No. 2662/2015, 16 July 2008.
49. Ibid., at paras. 8.8-8.9.
50. Ibid., at para. 8.9.
51. Ibid., at para. 8.12.
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women who want to wear the headscarf, thus again con-
cluding to intersectional discrimination on grounds of
religion and gender.52
3.1.3 Finally, considering the importance of education,
and, more particularly, the values transposed through
education for the future of society, and thus also for a
societal project of changing the hearts and minds, regard
should also be had to the provision on the state duties in
relation to the content of the public curriculum. In
terms of civil and political rights conventions, such as
the ICCPR and the ECtHR, this is framed in terms of
state duties to respect the religious and philosophical
convictions of the parents throughout public educa-
tion.53 Admittedly, this provision does not impose an
obligation on states to adopt an inclusive curriculum,
nor a curriculum that is geared towards the promotion
of tolerance amongst population groups. Nevertheless,
the HRC has a steady line of jurisprudence following
which Article 18(4) implies a duty for public education
to be neutral and objective, which would also imply pro-
tection against latent Islamophobia in the way the cur-
riculum is constructed and applied.
In Leirvag et al. v. Norway,54 parents complain about a
change in public education in Norway following which
the curriculum now contains an obligatory course on
Christianity and other religions, which disproportion-
ately favours Christianity, includes too many practice
elements and a complex and demanding system of part-
ial exemptions. According to the parents, this would
amount to a violation of their rights to have their reli-
gious convictions respected in the public education
system. Following a critical assessment of the content of
the course, the Committee concludes that this course is
indeed not neutral,55 which shifts the focus to the
exemption scheme. Since the Committee notes several
shortcomings to the system of partial exemptions which
would be too demanding on parents, and ultimately
unable to address their substantive concerns,56 it con-
cludes to a violation of Article 18, para. 4. While this
case does not concern latent forms of Islamophobia
creeping in the public curriculum, or the way the
exemption scheme is operated,57 the critical review by
the HRC implies a suitable check on any such potential
developments.
3.2 Concluding Observations
The review of the HRC’s Concluding Observations in
relation to European countries in the past few years con-
firms the HRC’s strong concern with the optimalisation
of the effective enforcement and realisation of the prohi-
bition of discrimination also in relation to Muslims. In
its review of the non-discrimination provisions of the
Covenant,58 the Committee is rather demanding about
52. Ibid., at para. 8.13.
53. Art. 18, 4 ICCPR.
54. HRC, Leirvag et al. v. Norway, Communication No. 1155/2003, 3
November 2004.
55. Leirvag et al. v. Norway, above n. 54, at para. 14.5.
56. Leirvag et al. v. Norway, above n. 54, at paras. 14.6-14.7.
57. See infra on Osmanoglu and Kocabas v. Switzerland.
58. Arts. 2, 3 and 26 ICCPR.
the need for comprehensive coverage of non-discrimi-
nation legislation, both concerning grounds and material
fields of operation.59 Of relevance to the focus of this
article, the HRC noted with concern – and asked Bel-
gium to eliminate – the legislative and procedural dis-
tinction between the treatment of racist and xenophobic
hate speech, on the one hand, and Islamophobic hate
speech, on the other.60 Notwithstanding the lack of indi-
vidual complaints about discriminatory violence before
the HRC, a recurring theme in several of the HRC’s
concluding observations is the concern it expresses
about the perseverance of hate crimes and hate speech
against religious and ethnic minorities, and problems in
investigation and prosecution thereof.61 In this regard,
the HRC develops three lines of supervisory practice,
one on the need to improve law enforcement to combat
hate crimes and hate speech, the second one on state
duties to actively promote tolerance among different
population groups and/or to eradicate stereotypes. The
third line focuses on ensuring adequate training of law
enforcement officials, judges and prosecutors, and
actually can be seen to strengthen the two preceding
lines, which in turn correspond to the two strands of
strategies that public authorities can adopt to counter
prejudice against particular groups, identified in the
introduction.
In addition to general statements concerning extra
efforts regarding law enforcement,62 the HRC urges
states specifically to ‘develop an effective strategy, in
cooperation with digital technology companies, to
reduce online hate speech’63 and to develop ‘effective
programmes for addressing manifestations of racial
discrimination and hate speech at public events,
including football matches’.64 The second line, regard-
ing the state duties to promote tolerance amongst differ-
ent population groups, at times does not go beyond the
mere statement calling on the state to heighten its
efforts to promote tolerance.65 At times, the HRC
becomes more explicit by adding that the state should
envisage ‘measures to promote an environment inclusive
of persons belonging to minorities, including with
59. See also K. Henrard, The Impact of International Non-discrimination
Norms in Combination with General Human Rights for the Protection
of National Minorities: Several United Nations Human Rights Conven-
tions, DH-MIN (2006), at 02, W. van den Hole, Non-Discrimination
and Equality in the View of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Ant-
werp, Intersentia (2005).
60. Concluding Observations on Belgium, 6 December 2019,
CCPR/C/BEL/CO/6, at para. 19.
61. Concluding Observations on Hungary, 9 May 2019,
CCPR/C/HUN/CO/6, at para. 17; Concluding Observations on Nor-
way, 25 April 2018, CCPR/C/NOR/CO/7, at para. 17.
62. Concluding Observations on Romania, 11 December 2017,
CCPR/C/ROU/CO/5, at para. 44; Concluding Observation on Norway,
25 April 2018, at para. 17 (with specific focus on the need to improve
the investigation capacity); Concluding Observations on Hungary, 9
May 2018, CCPR/C/HUN/CO/6, at para. 19; Concluding Observations
on the Czech Republic, 6 December 2019, CCPR/C/CZE/CO/4, at
para. 17(c).
63. Concluding Observations on the Netherlands, 6 December 2019,
CCPR/C/NLD/CO/5, at para. 16.
64. Ibid.
65. Concluding Observations on Norway 2018, at para. 17.
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respect of their linguistic and cultural rights’.66 In some
concluding observations, the Committee elaborates on
this further by calling on states to increase their ‘efforts
to eradicate stereotyping and discrimination … among
others by conducting public awareness campaigns to
promote tolerance and respect for diversity’.67 In the
third line, the HRC urges states to ‘ensure adequate
training on the promotion of racial, ethnic, and religious
diversity’68 and/or ‘on addressing hate crimes’69 not
only of law enforcement officials but also of judges and
prosecutors. The HRC also highlights the important
role of the media as regards both the avoidance of
speech that can be used to ‘instil fear of migrants and
asylum seekers and to strengthen stereotypical prejudi-
ces based on ethnicity or religion’70 and the active pro-
motion of understanding and respect for minority
groups. In the latter respect, the HRC recommends to
states to provide training aimed at media workers on
promoting racial, ethnic and religious diversity.71 Put
differently, the HRC is crucially aware of the important
role the media can play to influence public opinion, and
thus potentially changing the hearts and minds, also in
relation to Muslims.72
In line with its jurisprudence in Yaker v. France and
Hebbadj v. France, the HRC is critical in its Concluding
Observations about legislation that criminalises the
wearing of garments that conceal the face (in the Neth-
erlands and Belgium). The Committee does not only
note that this ban risks disproportionately infringing the
freedom to manifest one’s religion but even acknowl-
edges that this ban could increase the marginalisation of
Muslim women in society.73 Similarly, the Committee
notes that prohibitions to wear religious symbols at
work, in certain public bodies and by teachers and stu-
dents in public schools might entail violations of the
freedom of religion and the prohibition of discrimi-
nation, which could enhance the marginalisation of reli-
gious minorities.74 The Committee thus demonstrates a
keen awareness of the threats Islamophobia poses for the
equal participation of Muslim minorities in society, and
urges states to reconsider legislative bans with an Islam-
ophobic undercurrent.75
66. Concluding Observations on Romania 2018, at para. 44.
67. Concluding Observations on Hungary, at para. 18. See also Concluding
Observations on the Czech Republic, at para. 17, where the HRC calls
for ‘campaigns aimed at promoting respect for human rights and toler-
ance for diversity and revisiting and eradicating stereotypical prejudices
based on ethnicity or religion’.
68. Concluding Observations on the Netherlands 2019, at para. 16.
69. Concluding Observations on the Czech Republic 2019, at para. 17(d).
70. Ibid., at para. 16.
71. Ibid.
72. Concluding Observations on Hungary 2018, at para. 17.
73. Concluding Observations on the Netherlands, at para. 58; Concluding
Observations on Belgium, at para. 17.
74. Concluding Observations on Belgium, at para. 17.
75. Concluding Observations on the Netherlands, at para. 59; ibid., at para.
18.
4 The European Court of
Human Rights and
Islamophobia
The ECtHR is undoubtedly one of the most highly val-
ued international human rights courts, whose jurispru-
dence often serves as a source of inspiration for other
international and national courts.76 Nevertheless, some
of its lines of jurisprudence are criticised, some of which
concern the two fundamental rights most at issue in
relation to Islamophobia, namely the prohibition of
discrimination and the freedom to manifest one’s
religion.77 The analysis of the jurisprudence that is most
relevant for the perspective of this contribution needs to
be placed against the background of the typical features
of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in relation to the two
most relevant rights, the freedom to manifest one’s
religion and the prohibition of discrimination.
4.1 ECtHR Jurisprudence in Relation to the
Freedom of Religion and the Prohibition of
Discrimination
The Court’s jurisprudence regarding the freedom to
manifest one’s religion certainly has several promising
features regarding positive state obligations to counter
intolerance against particular religious groups. Indeed,
the Court tends to underscore that the freedom of
religion is centrally concerned with protecting and pro-
moting religious pluralism and mutual tolerance,78 fol-
lowing which states are supposed to be neutral and
impartial towards the multiple religions in its juris-
diction.79 This in turn has led the Court to highlight
that in case of struggles or tensions between religions,
states should not choose sides – they’d rather promote
religious harmony and tolerance.80 It needs to be
acknowledged though that the identification of these
promising positive state obligations go hand in hand
76. References to ECtHR jurisprudence can be found in the judgements of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and also several prestigious
national courts such as the Canadian Supreme Court: Ricardo Canese v.
Paraguay, Judgement, 31 August 2004, at paras. 89-90; Alberta v. Hut-
terian Brethren of Wilson Colony [2009] SCR 567 (Canada), at paras.
90, 128-131.
77. See Berry, above n. 31, and K. Henrard, ‘How the European Court of
Human Rights’ Concern regarding European Consensus Tempers the
Effective Protection of Freedom of Religion’, 4(3) Oxford Journal of
Law and Religion 398 (2015) and K. Henrard, ‘The European Court of
Human Rights, Ethnic and Religious Minorities and the Two Dimensions
of the Right to Equal Treatment: A Jurisprudence at Different Speeds?’,
34(03) Nordic Journal on Human Rights 157-77 (2016).
78. Inter alia, ECtHR, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App
no 45701/99, 16 December 2001. See also F. Tulkens, ‘The European
Convention on Human Rights and Church-State Relations: Pluralism v
Pluralism’, Cardozo Law Review 2579 (2009).
79. Noland and K v. Russia, ECHR (2009) Series A, No. 2512, 4, at para.
73. See also J. Murdoch, Council of Europe Human Rights Handbooks:
Protecting the Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion
Under the ECHR, Strasbourg: Council of Europe (2012), at 8.
80. Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, ECHR (2000) Series A, No. 30985, 96.;
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, ECHR (2001) Series A,
No. 45701, 99; Serif v. Greece, ECHR (1999) Series A, No. 38178, 97,
at para. 53.
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with the grant of a broad margin of appreciation.81 Fur-
thermore, the Court has a long and steady line of juris-
prudence granting states a broad margin of appreciation
in relation to the broad category of church-state rela-
tions.82 It is important to highlight that the grant of a
broad margin to states implies a particularly low level of
scrutiny by the Court, which potentially undermines the
effective protection of the freedom to manifest one’s
religion.83 While it has been argued more fully else-
where that the Court de facto reduces the margin of
appreciation concerning religious matters in those
instances in which a noticeable European consensus can
be denoted,84 this still leaves several controversies about
which no such consensus exists. The numerous cases of
prohibitions on wearing headscarves and the broad mar-
gin of appreciation left to states are a case in point.85
An important development in the Court’s jurisprudence
on the evaluation of allegedly neutral courses on reli-
gions and related exemptions needs highlighting, as this
is related to parents’ rights under Article 2 of the first
additional protocol to the ECtHR to have their religious
and philosophical convictions respected in the public
education system. In Folgero v. Norway, the ECtHR
departs from its traditional jurisprudence that left states
a very broad margin of appreciation, to the extent that it
allowed classes with a de facto dominant focus on the
traditional religion of a state. Indeed, in Folgero, the
Court, in line with the HRC’s Leirvag decision, most
critically assessed the course on religions and had con-
cluded that there was both quantitatively and qualita-
tively much more focus on Christianity than on other
religions.86 Following this critical assessment of the
required neutrality of the public school curriculum, the
Court emphasises the need for a proper system of
exemptions.87 Also, here the Court critically assessed
the partial system of exemptions in light of the need to
effectively protect the rights of parents to ensure the
education of their children in line with their own reli-
gious convictions,88 and concludes to a violation.89 The
shift in the Court’s jurisprudence implies that states
need to make sure that any course on religions does not
disproportionately focus on one religion, or does not
discredit (one or more) minority religions.
81. As Murdoch underscores ‘the maintenance of pluralism seems to be dis-
tinguishable from its active promotion’: Murdoch, above n. 79, at 35.
82. Sindicatul ‘Pa˘storul cel Bun’ v. Romania, ECHR (2013) Series A, No.
2330, 9, at paras. 61, 133, 160 and 171; Hasan and Eylem Zengin v.
Turkey, ECHR (2007) Series A, No. 1448, 4, at para. 63; Lautsi and
others v. Italy, ECHR Grand Chamber (2011) Series A, No. 30814, 6, at
para. 61.
83. See, inter alia, J. Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiar-
ity and Primarity in the ECHR, Brill (2009), at 238.
84. For a detailed discussion and analysis, see Henrard (2015), above n. 77.
85. Inter alia Leyla Sahin v. Turkey; App no 44774/98, 10 November 2005,
Dahlab v. France, App no 42393/98, 15 January 2001; Ebrahimian v.
France, App no 64846/11, 26 November 2015.
86. Folgero and others v. Norway, ECHR (2007) Series A, No. 15472, 2, at
paras. 90-95.
87. Ibid., at para. 96.
88. Ibid., at paras. 97-100.
89. Ibid., at para. 102.
Furthermore, for the longest time, the ECtHR’s non-
discrimination jurisprudence was compared to Cinder-
ella, as the Court tended to avoid evaluations of this
prohibition as much as possible, and when it did engage
in a non-discrimination analysis, it scrutinised lightly,
thus not providing effective protection.90 Admittedly,
over time, several improvements took place, such as the
increasing recognition of suspect grounds of discrimi-
nation, triggering heightened scrutiny.91 However, so
far the Court has avoided explicitly calling religion sus-
pect in cases in terms of Article 9 plus 14.92 Admittedly,
this does not mean that the Court does not provide
proper protection against cases of invidious discrimi-
nation, particularly when the intolerance takes on vio-
lent forms, as is visible in the cases on religiously
inspired violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses. The
string of cases against Georgia, a country known for the
high levels of societal intolerance against and discrimi-
nation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, show that the ECtHR
becomes ever demanding in terms of positive state obli-
gations to prevent, stop, prosecute and punish discrimi-
natory violence by private parties.93 Furthermore, the
Court’s initial reticence to acknowledge and problemat-
ise the apparent state acquiescence and silent support of
this private violence, was transformed in an identifica-
tion of discriminatory intent and prejudice against Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses among the Georgian police. The Court
actually established direct discrimination by the police,
due to the general and documented practice of the
90. R. O’Connell, ‘Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Article 14 and the Right to
Non-Discrimination in the ECHR’, 29(2) Legal Studies: the Journal of
the Society of Legal Scholars 211 (2009).
91. Several promising developments are noted in the article of O’Connell,
above n. 90; Henrard (2016), above n. 77; O.M. Arnardottir, ‘The
Differences that Make a Difference: Recent Developments on the
Discrimination Grounds and the Margin of Appreciation under Article
14 of the ECHR’, 14 Human Rights Law Review 647 (2014). For an
argument on the growing list of grounds that are considered suspect in
terms of non-discrimination law, see also A.F. Bayefsky, ‘The Principle
of Equality and Non-discrimination in International Law’, 11 Human
Rights Law Journal 1, at 24 (1990).
92. The Court has hinted at the suspect nature of religion as ground of dif-
ferentiation in cases on Art. 8 in combination with Art. 14 when a
parent was refused custody because of the religious minority back-
ground: Hoffmann v. Austria, ECHR (1993), No. 12875, 87, at para.
36. More recently confirmed in Vojnity v. Hungary, ECHR (2013) Series
A, No. 29617, 7. Similarly, the Court is ever more critical about the
need for non-discriminatory criteria and procedures concerning the reg-
istration and recognition of religions but this critical scrutiny is confined
to Art. 9 after which no scrutiny in terms of Art. 14 would be necessary:
Savez Crkava and others v. Croatia, ECHR (2010) Series A, No. 7798, 8,
at para. 88. A noticeable exception in this respect is Izettin Dogan and
others v. Turkey, ECHR (2016) Series A, No. 62649, 10, at paras.
170-173. Izettin Dogan as the Court actually did engage in a very
promising and explicit non-discrimination analysis under Art. 14, build-
ing on the critical assessment of serious problems regarding the state
duty of neutrality and impartiality under Art. 9, to highlight the need for
‘particular scrutiny’ of the less favourable treatment of the Alevi’s under
Art. 14 junctio 9.
93. Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and others v. Georgia,
ECHR (2014) Series A, No. 71156, 1; Begheluri and others v. Georgia,
ECHR (2014) Series A, No. 28490, 2; Tsartsidze ea v. Georgia, ECHR
(2017) Series A, No. 18766, 4.
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police to condone private violence against this religious
group.94
Notwithstanding the promising developments in rela-
tion to invidious discrimination, the Court still avoids a
distinct non-discrimination analysis in cases of direct or
indirect discrimination, when the complaint concerns
the expression of a separate minority identity (about
which no European consensus exists).95 In this respect,
it is also considered unlikely that the Court would fol-
low arguments about Islamophobia as a case of racial
discrimination, since race triggers heightened scruti-
ny.96
4.2 ECtHR Case Law ‘Concerning’
Islamophobia
Notwithstanding the growing prevalence of Islamopho-
bia in European societies, explicit acknowledgements by
the Court of an Islamophobic context are strikingly
sparse:97 So far, this only happened in one case, namely
S.A.S. v. France. The Court has been criticised for not
sufficiently acknowledging the Islamophobic context
and using Islamophobia as a key contextual factor in its
human rights analysis.98
In addition to the cases on religious discriminatory vio-
lence (against Muslims) (4.2.1.), several other cases of
more latent Islamophobia are relevant, more particularly
cases in which at first sight neutral measures are
adopted/applied in an Islamophobic context and result
in far-reaching limitations to the freedom to manifest
the Muslim religion, disproportionately affecting Mus-
lim women (4.2.2).
4.2.1 Regarding the former, the ECtHR’s case law on
Jehovah’s Witnesses demonstrates a proper protection
against hate crimes with a religious background, and has
considerable potential in relation to Islamophobic hate
crimes as well. Nevertheless, so far the Court does not
seem to have transposed its reasoning and strictness of
review regarding discriminatory violence against Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses to similar incidents against members of
the Muslim minority. Karaahmed v. Bulgaria concerned
a violent and severe disruption of the Friday prayer at
the Mosque in Sofia, by a political party known for its
anti-Islam attitude. Unfortunately, the Court avoided a
discrimination analysis altogether, including the possi-
94. Compare the 2007 Gldani case, on the one hand with the 2014 Beghe-
luri and 2017 Tsartsidze one. In the case of Tsartsidze, the Court did
not only establish bias and prejudice against Jehovah’s Witnesses
among the police but also among judges: at paras. 84-88.
95. See the Court’s reasoning in relation to Art. 14 inter alia in Winterstein
v. France, ECHR (2016) Series A, No. 27013, 7; Yordanova and Others
v. Bulgaria, ECHR (2012) Series A, No. 25446, 6; Cha’are Sjalom ve
Tsedek v. France, ECHR (2000) Series A, No. 27417, 95, at para. 87;
Hamidovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECHR (2017) Series A, No.
57792, 15.
96. T. Loenen, ‘Framing Headscarves and Other Multi-cultural Issues as
Religious, Cultural, Racial or Gendered: The Role of Human Rights
Law’, NQHR 488 (2012).
97. Trispiotis, above n. 7, at 21-2.
98. Ibid., at 21. Trispiotis highlights that the Court ‘as a result is liable to a
heightened danger of majoritarian bias’. 98 Karaahmed v. Bulgaria,
ECHR (2015) Series A, No. 30587, 13.
ble discriminatory animus among the police, and did not
identify a context of Islamophobia.99
4.2.2 Regarding the latter, Trispiotis noted that by 2018
the ECtHR has had roughly 40 cases brought by Mus-
lim individuals, complaining about the violation of the
freedom to manifest their religion and/or of the right
not to be discriminated against on grounds of
religion.100 In line with the preceding account of the
Court’s reluctance to engage in an explicit non-discrimi-
nation analysis when a case is intrinsically concerned
with the expression of a distinct minority identity, most
of these cases are dealt with in terms of Article 9’s free-
dom of religion.101 Notwithstanding the worrying signs
about increasing Islamophobia in Europe, as in the
Western world generally, particularly since the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 2001,102 there are hardly any explicit ref-
erences to Islamophobia in the ECtHR case law. Since
2014, only two third-party interveners have highlighted
the Islamophobic context of particular limitations to the
freedom to manifest the Muslim religion.103 The Court
itself has only once explicitly acknowledged the pres-
ence of an Islamophobic context, without, however, giv-
ing any weight to this context in the actual proportional-
ity analysis.104 It is important to realise that the lack of
explicit argumentation about an Islamophobic context
does not mean that Islamophobia did not play (an
important role) in other cases. The analysis of the Osma-
noglu case below will demonstrate how Islamophobia,
and related anxieties about the growing presence of the
Muslim minority in a state, can be present in a more
hidden form. Put differently, a close analysis of some of
the older cases (prior to 2001) could similarly reveal ear-
ly stages of Islamophobia, more particularly (most) cases
pertaining to the wearing of headscarves.105
The following analysis zooms in on the two most promi-
nent cases in which measures entailing restrictions on
the freedom to manifest the Muslim religion were
adopted in an explicit or at least implicit Islamophobic
context.
S.A.S. v. France is the very famous first case in which
the ECtHR was confronted with a piece of legislation,
dubbed burqa ban, which criminalised the concealing of
the face in public with garments.
The case was brought by a French Muslima who wears
the burqa for religious reasons, invoking a violation of
the freedom of religion and an indirect discrimination
on grounds of religion, since the ban would dispropor-
99. Ibid.; L. Peroni, ‘The (In)Visible Racial and Religious Motivation of Vio-
lence’, Strasbourg Observers (27 March 2015), available at: https://
strasbourgobservers.com/2015/03/27/karaahmed-v-bulgaria-the-
invisible-racial-and-religious-motivation-of-violence/ (last visited 30
September 2019).
100. Trispiotis, above n. 7, at 21-2, with reference to the Annex of his article
where all the cases are enumerated.
101. Ibid.
102. See the credible reports referred to above n. 1.
103. S.A.S v. France, Human Rights Centre of Ghent University, at para. 98;
Dakir v. Belgium, NGO Liberty, at para. 35.
104. For a more detailed analysis, see infra on the S.A.S. v. France case.
105. Leyla Sahin v. Turkey would probably be the exception, since Turkey is
a country with a dominant Muslim population.
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tionately affect Muslim women who want to conceal
their face for religious reasons. While the Court is suita-
bly critical towards several of the legitimate aims
invoked by France, it did accept that the legislative ban
served ‘requirements of living together’ which would
qualify as the legitimate aim respect for the rights and
freedoms of others.106 Strikingly, in its review of this
legitimate aim, the Court notes itself with concern the
information it received that the legislative discussions
concerned were tainted by Islamophobic remarks.107
The Court noted that ‘a state which enters into a
legislative process of this kind takes the risk of contribu-
ting to the consolidation of stereotypes and of encourag-
ing the expression of intolerance, while states actually
have a duty to promote tolerance.’108
Unfortunately, the Court develops at least three worry-
ing lines of reasoning in this judgment, amounting to
three failures to provide a counter narrative to the
Islamophobia it has expressed concern about.109 Critical
arguments can be formulated about the legitimate aim
the Court accepts, the light proportionality review and
the avoidance of a proper non-discrimination analysis.
First of all, it is far from obvious that the Court would
accept ‘requirements of living together’ as amounting to
‘respect for the rights and freedoms of others’, one of
the exhaustively enumerated legitimate aims in Article 9
ECtHR. Indeed, who are ‘the others’ the protection of
whose rights would legitimate an interference with the
rights of Muslim women wanting to wear the full-face
veil? The others can only refer to the majority
population in France. The Court’s acceptance of this
majoritarian argument by the French government
squarely contradicts the counter-majoritarian core of the
entire fundamental rights paradigm.110 Secondly, when
the Court proceeds to grant France a broad margin of
appreciation, the Court extends the majoritarianism it
introduced with the legitimate aim, thus producing a
second failure to counter the underlying Islamophobia.
Importantly, when evaluating the legitimate aim of ‘liv-
ing together’, the Court had underscored that the flexi-
bility of this notion entails the risk of abuse which
would require a careful examination of the proportional-
ity of the interference concerned.111 Unfortunately,
when proceeding with the proportionality review the
Court chooses to highlight and rely on reasons why
France should still get a broad margin of appreciation,
namely because it would concern a choice of society
about which no European consensus exists.112 The third
106. S.A.S. v. France, ECHR (2014) Series A, No. 43835, 11, at para. 122. In
the meantime, two similar cases against Belgium (both decided 11 July
2017, have resulted in similar defences by Belgium with the ECtHR con-
firming its (troubling) argumentation in S.A.S.: Dakir v. Belgium and
Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium.
107. S.A.S. v. France, at para. 149.
108. Ibid.
109. See also Trispiotis, above n. 7, at 21.
110. K. Henrard, The Ambiguous Relationship between Religious Minorities
and Fundamental (Minority) Rights, Boom Eleven International (2011),
at 19-34.
111. S.A.S. v. France, at para. 122.
112. Ibid., at paras. 154-156.
failure to counter the underlying Islamophobia lies in
the Court’s refusal to engage in a distinct, proper non-
discrimination analysis. Indeed, the Court swiftly dis-
misses the non-discrimination complaint with a simple
reference to the reasons it has adduced to conclude to a
non-violation of Article 9 ECtHR.113 The Court thus
extends the majoritarian reasoning it introduced under
Article 9 to Article 14 junctio 9. Put differently, in a
situation the Court itself notes as being tainted by
Islamophobia, and thus prejudice against the Muslim
minority,114 instead of giving pride of place to the prohi-
bition of discrimination , and being extra vigilant when
scrutinizing the discrimination complaint, the Court
further demotes this norm notwithstanding its central
role for the human rights paradigm.115
Osmanoglu and Kocabas v. Switzerland is at first sight a
very different case as it does not concern the crimin-
alisation of the wearing of garments with religious con-
notations. It does concern the limitation of the rights of
Muslim parents to have their daughters, for religious
reasons, exempted from mixed swimming classes, a
compulsory course in the public school concerned.
When the parents persisted in their refusal to let their
girls take part in the mixed swimming classes, they were
fined. The parents claimed the violation of their right to
manifest their religion.116 The government justifies the
interference in the parents’ rights as necessary for
respect of the rights of others, more particularly the
social integration of foreign children from different cul-
tures and religions, and to protect them against every
phenomenon of social exclusion.117 There is no
comparable case of biased law making as in S.A.S, but
the highest Swiss Court had explicitly noted in relation
to this case that the concern about social integration is
particularly relevant for the Muslim minority, as it has
grown so exponentially over the years.118 This may not
constitute outright Islamophobia; the Muslim minority
is conceived as a threat to the integrity of the Swiss
society. When the highest national Court expresses such
a concern, this arguably reflects a broader societal con-
text of unease about the Muslim minority in Switzer-
land.
Unfortunately, the Court’s reasoning in several respects
constitutes a failure to address the underlying negative
sentiment about the Muslim minority. First of all,
accepting as legitimate aim ‘respect for the rights of
others’ the argument about the need to optimise the
social integration of foreign children from different cul-
113. Ibid., at paras. 161-162.
114. See also L. Peroni, ’Religion and Culture in the Discourse of the ECtHR:
The Risk of Stereotyping and Naturalising’, 10 International Journal of
Law in Context 215 (2014).
115. See also Trispiotis, above n. 7, at 26-9.
116. Since Switzerland has not ratified the first optional protocol, including
the provision on the right of parents to have their religious convictions
respected throughout public education, the Court needs to address this
complaint in light of Art. 9 ECHR.
117. Osmanoglu and Kocabas v. Switzerland, ECHR (2017) Series A, No.
29086, 12, at para. 31.
118. Decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (2008) BGW 135179.
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tures and religions, again constitutes majoritarian rea-
soning, since the rights of the minority are opposed to
the interests of the majority in an integrated society.
This majoritarianism is again extended through the
Court’s grant of a wide margin of appreciation, resulting
in a minimal level of scrutiny of the interference con-
cerned. Admittedly, the Court cannot evaluate this mat-
ter in light of protocol 1, Article 2; nevertheless, it is
quite striking that the Court does not undertake any
effort to evaluate the actual tension between a mixed
swimming class and the religious convictions of parents,
nor the impact of the extremely restricted exemption
scheme used in the public school concerned.
Arguably, what both these cases show is that the ECtHR
does not guide states towards tolerance, but rather con-
firms the Islamophobic attitude of the governments,119
thus allowing the majority to be intolerant towards the
manifestation of the Muslim identity, which in turn may
actually fuel Islamophobia.120 Furthermore, the lack of
engagement with the explicit or implicit121 discrimi-
nation complaint by the claimants seems ill placed:
Particularly in the European societies with the
increasing prevalence of Islamophobia, one would
expect a human rights court to take every opportunity to
deploy the prohibition of discrimination, heed and
employ signs of an Islamophobic context in the evalua-
tion of a disproportionate application of neutral rules
that seem to target Muslims.122
Sadly, two more recent cases on limitations to wearing
the headscarf confirm the Court’s lack of using Islamo-
phobia as a relevant contextual factor in its human
rights analysis. Both cases concern limitations on the
wearing of the headscarf in the Court setting, one by a
witness (Hamidovic v. Bosnia Herzegovina) and one by a
civil party in a criminal case (Lachiri v. Belgium).123, 124
Importantly, the Court did establish a violation of Art-
icle 9, thus helpfully indicating limits to the extent to
which states can limit religious dress in public settings.
Nevertheless, the Court still chose not to engage in an
explicit non-discrimination analysis,125 notwithstanding
119. See also Peroni (2014), above n. 114, at 215-6.
120. See also S. Gohir, ‘The Veil Ban in Europe: Gender Equality or Gendered
Islamophobia’, 24 Georgetown Journal of International Relations 30-31
(2015); K. Brayson, ‘Of Bodies and Burkinis: Institutional Islamophobia,
Islamic Dress and the Colonial Condition’, 46 Journal of Law and
Society 80-81 (2019).
121. Osmanoglu and Kocabas v. Switzerland, above n. 117, at paras. 61 and
96. The parents in Osmanoglu and Kocabas v. Switzerland had not
formulated an explicit discrimination complaint, but they had argued
that the exemption scheme in the public school had been implemented
in a discriminatory fashion, as they alleged that exemptions asked by
Christian Orthodox parents had been approved. The Court simply notes
that the parents had not supported their claims by adequate proof.
122. See also Trispiotis, above at n. 7, at 32-3.
123. Hamidović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECHR (2017) Series A, No.
57792, 15, at para. 40.
124. Lachiri v. Belgium, ECHR (2018) Series A, No. 3413, 09.
125. In Hamidovic v. Bosnia Herzegovina, the Court opined that following
the establishment of a violation of Art. 9, it would no longer be neces-
sary to evaluate the Art. 14 complaint (at para. 47). Lachiri v. Belgium
the plaintiff did not raise an Art. 14 complaint before the ECtHR but she
has done so before the national courts, so that the ECtHR could have
requalified her complaint, following the jura novit curia adagio.
the clearly Islamophobic context in which the applica-
tion of neutral rules has a disproportionate impact on
women wearing Islamic headscarves. Indeed, it is
impossible to miss the elevated levels of Islamophobia in
Belgium, while the Bosnian genocide in the territory of
Bosnia Herzegovina targeted Muslim Bosnians, and
anti-Muslim sentiments in the region have been noted
to be on the increase.126 Both of these cases raise inter-
esting questions about disproportionate applications of
neutral rules that seem to point to the targeting of Mus-
lims. The Court’s failure to address these questions
ignores the underlying Islamophobia, instead of provid-
ing the much-needed counter narrative.
5 The Framework Convention
for the Protection of
National Minorities and Its
Advisory Committee
The preamble to the FCNM highlights the importance
of an adequate protection of minorities for peace and
stability in Europe, while highlighting that a climate of
tolerance and dialogue needs to be created so that
cultural diversity is a source of enrichment, not of divi-
sion for each society. The preamble also clarifies that in
the end the FCNM is about ensuring that the funda-
mental rights of minorities are fully and effectively pro-
tected, while building on United Nations (UN) and
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) standards in this respect. The preamble thus
already identifies the foundational principles and the
ultimate goals of the FCNM and minority protection,
namely equality, identity and participation, aimed at the
inclusion of minorities in national society. The FCNM
can be seen to be built on three pillar provisions:127 Art-
icle 4 on full and effective equal treatment of persons
belonging to minorities, Article 5 on the right to respect
for the separate minority identity and Article 6 on the
inclusion/integration of minorities.
5.1 Possibly Relevant Provisions FCNM
When considering the explicit provisions of the FCNM
that concern state duties to counter intolerance and
prejudice against national minorities, there are two that
require special attention, namely Article 6 and 12
FCNM. Article 6 indeed obliges state parties to
126. See, inter alia the EU-funded European Islamophobia Report 2018,
available at: www.islamophobiaeurope.com/wp-content/uploads/
2019/09/EIR_2018.pdf.
127. Arts. 4-6 are the first three articles of Section II, containing the substan-
tive articles of the FCNM Section I concerns the ‘location’ of the FCNM
in the broader field of human rights and international law; Section III
pertains to possible limitations and restrictions, whilst Section IV outlines
the supervision system of the FCNM and Section V ratifications, denun-
ciations, etc.
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encourage a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dia-
logue, and take effective measures to promote mutual
respect and understanding and co-operation among
all persons living on their territory, irrespective of
those persons’ ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious
identity, in particular in the fields of education, cul-
ture and the media.
The relevant educational article, Article 12(1) FCNM
identifies state obligations in relation to the public cur-
riculum, more particularly to ‘take measures in the
fields of education and research to foster knowledge of
the culture, history, language and religion of their
national minorities and of the majority’. The Explanato-
ry Report to the FCNM clarifies that Article 12 FCNM
‘seeks to promote knowledge of the culture, history, lan-
guage and religion of both national minorities and the
majority population in an intercultural perspective. The
aim is to create a climate of tolerance and dialogue’
(emphasis added). Article 12(1) FCNM clearly aims at
an inclusive educational setting, in which the distinctive
groups are taught together, in a spirit of tolerance and
mutual understanding. Inclusive, multicultural educa-
tion is furthermore promoted by state duties to facilitate
contact between students and teachers of different com-
munities (Article 12(2) FCNM) and state duties to pro-
mote equal access to education at all levels for minority
students (Article 12(3) FCNM).
Given the close link between discrimination on the one
hand, and the underlying stereotypes, prejudice and
intolerance on the other, one would expect extensive
attention to problems of Islamophobia in relation to Art-
icle 4 (equality) FCNM. Similarly, as Islamophobic acts
and policies often imply limitations to the freedom of
religion, attention to Islamophobia is similarly envisaged
in the supervisory practice under Article 8 FCNM.
5.2 FCNM Supervisory Practice Countering
Islamophobia: Articles 6 and 8 FCNM
When reviewing the AC/FCNM supervisory practice,
it is striking that for two of these four articles, there is
(virtually) no attention to Islamophobia and Muslims as
minority, more particularly Articles 4 (equality)128 and
12 (3) (education, curriculum) FCNM.129 The AC/
FCNM does contain elaborate attention for Islamopho-
bia and state duties to counter this in terms of Articles 6
(integration, inclusion) and 8 (freedom of religion)
FCNM.
In relation to Article 6, the Committee highlights the
inhibiting impact of prejudice, in the sense that preju-
dice can block equal access to jobs and socio-economic
participation more generally.130 The AC does not shy
away from identifying clear state obligations to combat
stereotypes and prejudice and to promote tolerance and
128. Compilation 3rd cycle Art. 4, has only four references to Muslims (next
to other groups, such as Roma), and only one to Muslims specifically.
Strikingly, the references to stereotypes all concerned Roma.
129. Compilation 4th cycle and 3rd cycle Art. 12 does not feature the word
Islam or Muslim, at all.
130. Compilation 4th cycle Art. 15, Opinion on Finland, at 20.
intercultural dialogue throughout society as a whole.131
In relation to Muslims, the AC notes with concern that
many stereotypes are at play, often impeding the mani-
festation of their religion.132 In this respect, the AC rec-
ommends to state parties to make active efforts to
improve dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims
and to fight intolerance and Islamophobia.133 Govern-
ments are urged to be vigilant that public discourse, e.g.
against wearing the hijab in public spaces, does not fuel
Islamophobia.134
Also, in terms of Article 8 on the freedom to manifest
the minority religion, there is considerable attention for
problems of Islamophobia and discrimination of Mus-
lims. The AC problematises several forms of intimida-
tion such as raids by the police, and insults and attacks
against people who wear religious clothes, and places
these restrictions in an Islamophobic context. The Com-
mittee correctly highlights that these disproportionate
restrictions have a stifling effect on the manifestation of
Islam, making the practice of the Muslim religion more
complicated. Insofar as these restrictions originate from
public authorities, they are not only problematic in
themselves but also contain a symbolic message to
society at large, disfavouring the Muslim population
group, ‘othering’ them.135 This carries the risk of influ-
encing the public at large, feeding into pre-existing ster-
eotypes about Muslims, with the concomitant exclu-
sionary effects. Insofar as these restrictions originate
from private persons (insults and attacks related to man-
ifestations of the Muslim religion), the AC identifies
positive state obligations to develop legislation prohibit-
ing such actions, and enforcing these prohibitions.136
131. Compilation 4th cycle Art. 6, Opinion on Czech Republic, at 14. Compi-
lation 3rd cycle Art. 6, Opinions on Moldova, at 44, Slovak Republic, at
52 and Spain, at 54-6.
132. Compilation 4th cycle Art. 6, Opinion on Austria, at 6. The AC high-
lights in the Compilation of opinions under Art. 6 from the 3rd cycle,
inter alia that public debate against particular manifestations of Muslim
religion, such as ritual slaughter and the wearing of headscarves, can be
seen to reveal anti-Muslim sentiments and undermine a culture of dia-
logue: Council of Europe, ‘Compilation of Advisory Committee Public
Opinions from the 3rd cycle relating to Article 6 of the Framework Con-
vention for the Protection of National Minorities’ (hereafter: Compila-
tion 3rd cycle Art. 6) (13 May 2016), Opinion on Azerbaijan, at 5;
Opinion on Russian Federation, at 19 and Opinion on Ukraine, at 21.
AC/FCNM Compilation of Opinions of the AC relating to Art. 6 of the
FCNM (Third Cycle), May 2016, at 86-7 (Moldova). Available at:
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/
DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016805a99f0. AC/FCNM
Compilation of Opinions of the AC relating to Art. 6 of the FCNM
(Fourth Cycle), September 2017, at 6-7 (Austria), 26 (Germany) and
54-5 (Spain). Available at: https://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?
documentId=0900001680648f59.
133. Compilation 3rd cycle Art. 6, Opinion on UK, at 152-215.
134. Compilation 3rd cycle Art. 6, Opinion on Spain, at 133.
135. The AC problematises several other disproportionate restrictions by
public authorities, such as limiting the availability of burial sites and
funeral services, the regulation of religious holidays, and restrictions on
additional places of worship: AC/FCNM Compilation of Opinions of the
AC relating to Art. 8 of the FCNM (Third Cycle), May 2016, at 6 (Bul-
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5.3 Existing Lines of FCNM Jurisprudence That
Could Be Used in Relation to Islamophobia
The AC could develop this ‘Islamophobia’ awareness
also in relation to other FCNM articles, in line with sev-
eral of its overarching lines of jurisprudence.
The AC/FCNM tends to underscore that governments
should attach a positive value to diversity and different
identities in society, diversity being represented as
something that should be embraced, not something that
should be shunned or eliminated. State parties are even
urged to protect and promote the image of national
society as an inclusive society.137 Furthermore, the AC
exhibits a keen understanding of what is presupposed
for the effective enjoyment of rights, for the importance
of measures that are needed to make rights accessible
and effective. Arguably, state obligations to counter
prejudice and intolerance against particular groups,
blocking these groups’ effective participation in society,
nicely fits in this strand of thinking.
In relation to Article 4 FCNM on equality, the AC’s
supervisory practice has recurring themes that also work
in favour of improving Muslims’ effective protection
against discrimination. The AC is rather demanding
about the legislative framework that needs to be in
place, encompassing all relevant grounds, including
religion and race/ethnicity, and having a broad material
scope of application.138 In addition, this equality legisla-
tion needs to be properly monitored, special attention
going to the establishment of equality bodies, with suffi-
cient competences and resources.139 The AC further-
more highlights state duties to combat intolerance and
promote mutual understanding (in line with Article 6
FCNM) and even urges states to develop campaigns to
eradicate stereotypes.140 Nevertheless, as it stands, these
general obligations are extensively developed in relation
to Roma, but not (yet) in relation to Muslims.141 Put
differently, the general awareness of the importance of
public authorities’ active engagement in campaigns to
counter intolerance and prejudice in order to give effect
to state obligations under Article 4 FCNM have not yet
been translated in positive state obligations to counter
Islamophobia. The potential is there though.
Similarly, the AC has developed steady lines of juris-
prudence in terms of Article 12 FCNM (as combined
with Article 6) about the importance of an inclusive,
multicultural curriculum, which encourages tolerance,
dialogue and mutual understanding amongst the differ-
137. The AC, e.g. urges states to overcome linguistic barriers of national
minorities to effective access to public services by making the public ser-
vice more multilingual: Compilation 4th cycle Art. 15, Opinion on Mol-
dova, at 32; Compilation 4th cycle Art. 15, Opinion on Finland, at 21;
Compilation 4th cycle Art. 15, Opinion on Hungary, at 25; Compilation
4th cycle Art. 15, Opinion on Moldova, at 32.
138. Compilation Art. 4 – Cycles 3 and 4.
139. Ibid.
140. Compilation Art. 4, Cycles 3, at 61 and at 90.
141. When reviewing the Compilation of views on Art. 4 of the 3rd and 4th
cycles, the AC views tend to have a separate heading on Roma, and
most talk about stereotypes is formulated in relation to Roma. Some-
how there are only a few references to Muslims: the exception in cycle
3, at 60 and 97.
ent groups living together in society,142 ultimately pro-
moting the teaching of the different groups together.143
The AC’s Thematic Commentary on Education follows
Article 29 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) in this respect.144
While the AC has not been explicit about a place for
Islam in the curriculum in this respect, it regularly
underscores throughout its opinions the importance of
an inclusive curriculum, promoting respect for religious
diversity, and combating stereotypes affecting religious
and ethnic groups.145 The AC furthermore urges state
parties to regularly review curricula and textbooks,146 so
as to ensure that the entire curriculum reflects the
diversity of religious and ethnic identities.147 Further-
more, the AC emphasises the importance of religion as
element of identity to be taken into account when pro-
moting multicultural and intercultural education, and,
ultimately, equal access to education in an atmosphere
of tolerance.148 Unsurprisingly, the AC’s Thematic
Commentary on Education similarly aims at promoting
effectively equal access to education of religious minori-
ties, which is facilitated through the multicultural con-
tent of the curriculum, also having regard to the distinc-
tive religions of minorities. Hopefully, the AC can apply
in the upcoming supervision cycles this general line of
reasoning also in favour of Islam, promoting the under-
standing of this religion, and thus the equal and effec-
tive inclusion of Muslim minorities in public education.
Finally, when exploring the potential of the FCNM to
counter Islamophobia and identifying positive state obli-
gations in this respect, it is important to also have regard
for the transversal importance of Article 15 FCNM on
142. Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities – Opinion on the Netherlands (25 June 2009)
ACFC/OP/I(2009)002, at para. 56. See also Second Opinion on Swit-
zerland (2 September 2008) ACFC/OP/II(2008)002, at para. 85; Opin-
ion on Germany (1 March 2006) ACFC/OPII(2006)001, at para. 88.
143. Thematic Commentary No.1 on Education, at 16-17.
144. The Hague Recommendations regarding the Education Rights of
National Minorities promoted by the HCNM similarly highlight the
importance of an inclusive curriculum, in the sense that the teaching of
histories, cultures and traditions of their respective national minorities
should be included. This type of curriculum is depicted as essential for
the promotion of tolerance and multiculturalism (paras. 19-20).
145. Council of Europe, ‘Compilation of Advisory Committee Public Opinions
from the fourth cycle relating to Article 6 of the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities’ (hereafter: Compilation 4th
cycle Art. 6) (18 September 2017), Opinion on Denmark, at 15 and
Opinion on FYROM, at 39. See also OSCE High Commissioner on
National Minorities (HCNM), ‘Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of
Diverse Societies’ (7 November 2012) at 54.
146. AC/FCNM Compilation of Opinions of the AC relating to Art. 12 of the
FCNM (4th Cycle), September 2017, at 11; AC/FCNM Compilation of
Opinions of the AC relating to Art. 12 of the FCNM (3rd Cycle), May
2016, at 24-25.
147. Thematic Commentary No. 1 on Education, at 11. AC/FCNM Compila-
tion of Opinions of the AC relating to Art. 12 of the FCNM (3rd Cycle),
May 2016, at 13-14 (Bosnia-Herzegovina); AC/FCNM Compilation of
Opinions of the AC relating to Art. 12 of the FCNM (4th Cycle) Sep-
tember 2017, at 9-12 (Cyprus) and 41 (Northern Ireland).
148. Thematic Commentary No. 1 on Education, at 15-16. AC/FCNM Com-
pilation of Opinions of the AC relating to Art. 12 of the FCNM (4th
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participation and participatory rights of minorities, not
in the least because of its close interrelation with Article
4 on real and effective equality for persons belonging to
minorities.149 The reach of participatory rights encom-
passes not only political participation but also socio-
economic participation, and, ultimately, participation in
society at large.150 When combining these participatory
rights with the pillars of the FCNM, namely equality,
identity and participation/inclusion, this would protect
and promote the full inclusion of minorities, with their
distinct identity, as component part of society, on an
equal footing with members of the majority.151 As with
Articles 4 and 12 FCNM, so far Islamophobia has not
received much attention in terms of Article 15 FCNM.
Nevertheless, the above-mentioned baseline under-
standing of Article 15 FCNM and its implications clear-
ly has potential to counter acts/policies with an Islamo-
phobic undercurrent, such as indirectly discriminatory
measures that de facto exclude minorities from society,
from public life and from public education.
6 Comparison of Fault Lines in
the Jurisprudence of the
Three International
Supervisory Mechanisms
Islamophobia, like xenophobia, points to deep-seated,
ingrained discrimination against a particular group,
whose effective enjoyment of fundamental rights is
impaired. This in turn triggers the human rights obliga-
tions of liberal democratic states, more particularly
states’ positive obligations to ensure that fundamental
rights are effectively enjoyed, and thus also respected in
private, horizontal relationships.
As states, positive human rights obligations are not
absolute but are constrained by reasonability considera-
tions (what can one reasonably expect from a govern-
ment), and by possible conflicting fundamental rights
and related state obligations, this raises difficult ques-
tions about the extent to which and the way in which
states would be obliged to counter Islamophobia, and
particularly the underlying prejudice.
As highlighted in the introduction, when conceiving of
strategies that states could adopt in order to counter
Islamophobia., roughly two strands come to mind: On
the one hand, the active promotion of tolerance, inter
alia through awareness-raising campaigns and the stim-
ulation of intercultural dialogue; on the other, counter-
149. Explanatory Note to FCNM (1995) H(95)10, at para. 80.
150. See, inter alia Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities Commentary on the Effective Par-
ticipation of Persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social
and Economic Life and in Public Affairs, ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, 27
February 2008.
151. See also F. Palermo, ‘The Dual Meaning of Participation: The Advisory
Committee’s Commentary to Article 15 of the FCNM’, European Year-
book of Minority Issues 412 (2007/8).
ing acts informed by intolerance, bringing the non-
discrimination strategies to mind, including the preven-
tion/halting/punishment of discriminatory violence.
Reviewing the relevant standards and the related super-
visory practice of three international supervisory
mechanisms has shown that the first strand is markedly
less developed in terms of human rights law, especially
in terms of explicit standards that easily allow through
interpretation to identify positive state obligations to
promote tolerance. Indeed, it is mainly in the FCNM,
in some of the minority-specific standards that explicit
references can be found to positive state obligations to
encourage a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dia-
logue. Notwithstanding these promising explicit refer-
ences to state duties to counter intolerance, it has been
noted that the AC/FCNM supervisory practice has not
yet fully embraced all its potential to counter Islamo-
phobia and identify positive state obligations to counter
it, more particularly in relation to the equality and the
educational themes.
Still, the acknowledgement of the crucial importance of
education for the promotion of tolerance, including the
content of the curriculum and the extent to which the
educational system is geared towards educating the dif-
ferent groups together, brings the educational provi-
sions in general human rights conventions to the fore.
After all, education concerns the future generations, and
is generally a key concern for both minorities152 and the
majority society. The supervisory practice, in terms of
the ECtHR and ICCPR, has developed a more outspo-
ken concern about indoctrination, and scrutinises states’
choices in terms of curriculum stricter so as to prevent
too one-sided an attention to one particular (dominant)
religion. Nevertheless, no state obligations in terms of
an inclusive curriculum have been identified as yet, nor
the possible implications for religious dress and mixed
swimming in public schools. The HRC’s strict approach
towards the legitimacy of limitations to the enjoyment of
fundamental rights has managed to provide space for
the expression of Muslim religion in the public school
environment though.
When turning to the second strand, that of countering
acts of intolerance, and the related anti-discrimination
strategies, a rather mixed picture emerges. The baseline
strict level of scrutiny adopted by the HRC appears to
entail the highest level of actual protection against acts
of intolerance infused by Islamophobia, also the more
hidden forms of intolerance, in contrast to the overall
disappointing record of the ECtHR. The AC/FCNM’s
religious sensitive approach leads to promising supervi-
sory practice in terms of Article 8’s freedom of religion,
but is neither matched by the supervisory practice in
terms of the FCNM’s prohibition of discrimination nor
the educational rights.
152. Minority-specific instruments always have ample attention for educa-
tion, as does the supervisory practice, including any thematic recom-
mendations or commentaries: the HCNM sponsored The Hague Rec-
ommendations on Education Rights of persons belonging to National
Minorities, and the AC/FCNM Thematic Commentary on Education are
documents in point.
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The HRC’s jurisprudence reveals that with a strong
baseline protection against interferences with funda-
mental rights, pricking through prejudice, a strong pro-
tection against Islamophobia is forthcoming also when
one does not acknowledge the Islamophobic context.
The HRC’s willingness to engage in non-discrimination
analysis also implies an openness to recognise intersec-
tional discrimination, which is often at play in case of
Islamophobia.153 The multiple criticisms against the
ECtHR’s jurisprudence regarding the freedom of
religion and the prohibition of discrimination remain
valid in relation to its case law on cases with an Islamo-
phobic undertone. Indeed, in these cases, the Court
miserably fails to give due weight to an Islamophobic
context, while its majoritarian reasoning rubberstamps
governments policies informed by Islamophobia, and it
evades an actual non-discrimination analysis. Arguably,
when an international supervisory mechanism does not
have a strong baseline protection against interferences
with fundamental rights, it is essential that an Islamo-
phobic context is factored in explicitly in the human
rights analysis, triggering heightened scrutiny for the
freedom of religion, as well as an explicit non-discrimi-
nation analysis.





State Obligations to Counter
Islamophobia
The convincingly documented and far-reaching human
rights implications of Islamophobia make the question
how far states’ positive obligations extend to counter
Islamophobia highly relevant. The preceding compar-
ative analysis of the practice of three international
supervisory mechanisms has revealed a rather mixed
record and overall considerable scope for a clarification
of positive state obligations to counter Islamophobia,
regarding both of the possible strands of strategies of
states to counter intolerance. The following recommen-
dations are meant to contribute to the emergence of a
more complete and coherent body of international
supervisory practice regarding positive state obligations
to counter Islamophobia.
In relation to the strand of active promotion of toler-
ance, the practice of international supervisory mechan-
isms could complement the scarce provisions in human
rights instruments, explicitly imposing obligations to
153. Trispiotis, above n. 7, at 14. Argues that many cases of Islamophobia
can be framed as cases of intersectional discrimination.
promote tolerance, mutual understanding and intercul-
tural dialogue. The use of systematic interpretation
would be commendable here as this would enable the
interpretation of general human rights in light of the
overarching effectiveness principle while taking into
account more elaborate and explicit human rights provi-
sions on state duties to promote tolerance. Article
31(3)© Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) indeed allows international supervisory
mechanisms when interpreting a treaty to take into
account the broader normative environment, including
general international law and any relevant legal obli-
gation.154 In relation to education, and the effective and
equal access to education, the requirements in terms of
an inclusive curriculum visible in the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
CRC and FCNM could inspire the interpretation of
educational provisions in other conventions as well.
Similarly, as elsewhere extensively argued, the right to
equal treatment allows for an interpretation of the right
to equal treatment as encompassing duties of reasonable
accommodation also on grounds of religion.155 The
related duties of differential treatment could also
encompass the recognition of exemptions to general
(neutral) rules, especially when not doing so would
entail exclusions of particular religious groups, as we
identified above in relation to Muslim minorities in
Europe.
In relation to acts informed by intolerance, the inter-
national supervisory practice could highlight that in case
of signs of an Islamophobic context, strict scrutiny of
alleged violations of fundamental rights is called for, as
well as an explicit non-discrimination analysis. The lat-
ter explicit engagement with the prohibition of discrimi-
nation would be in line with the higher risk of unlawful
discrimination in an Islamophobic context.156 Further-
more, an Islamophobic context could work similarly as
the presence of a suspect ground, thus triggering
heightened scrutiny, including a more probing scrutiny
to unveil hidden direct discrimination.
In the end, if international supervisory mechanisms
would develop this more complete understanding of
positive state obligations to counter Islamophobia, this
would not only put states on notice that they should
more proactively counter the underlying anti-Muslim
prejudice but would also avoid any impression that
these international supervisory mechanisms themselves
are condoning or disregarding deep-seated discrimi-
nation against Muslim minorities in Europe.
154. Inter alia V.P. Tzevelekos, ‘The Use of Article 31(3)© of the VLCT in the
Case Law of the ECtHR: An Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or a
Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of Human Rights Teleology?
Between Evolution and Systemic Integration’, 31 Michigan Journal of
International Law 631 (2009-2010).
155. K. Henrard, ‘Duties of Reasonable Accommodation on Grounds of
Religion in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: A
Tale of (Baby) Steps Forward and Missed Opportunities’, 14(4) ICON
(2016).
156. Trispiotis, above n. 7, at 32-3.
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